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Women in the boardroom and their impact on climate change related 
disclosure 
Abstract 
Purpose - This paper aims to investigate the relationship between gender diversity and the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) score/index. Specifically, the study describes extant 
research on theoretical perspectives, and the impact of women on corporate boards (WOB) 
on carbon emission issues in the global perspective. 
 
Design/methodology/approach - This study uses the carbon disclosure scores of the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) from 2011 to 2013 (inclusive). A total observation for the three 
year periods is 1175 companies. However, based on data availability for the model, our 
sample size totals 331 companies in 33 countries with firms in 12 geographical locations. We 
used a model which is estimated using the fixed-effects estimator. 
 
Findings -The outcomes of the study reveal that there is a positive relationship between 
gender diversity (WOB) and carbon disclosure information. In addition to establishing a 
relationship between CDP score and other control variables, this study also found a 
relationship with Board size, asset size, energy consumption, and Tobin’s Q, which is 
common in the existing literature. 
 
Research limitations/implications -The limitations of the study mostly revolve around 
samples and the time period. To further test the generalizability and cross-sectional validity 
of the outcomes, it is suggested that the proposed framework be tested in more socially 
responsible firms.  
 
Practical implications -There are increasing pressures for WOBs from diverse stakeholders, 
such as the European Commission, national governments, politicians, employer lobby 
groups, shareholders, Fortune and FTSE rankings and best places for women to work lists. 
The study offers insights to policy makers implementing gender quota legislation. 
 
Originality/value -The study has important implications for putting into practice good 
corporate governance and in particular, gender diversity. The outcomes of our analyses 
advocate that companies that included women directors and with a smaller board size may 
expect to achieve a higher level of carbon emission performance and to voluntarily disclose 
the level of carbon information assessment requested by the CDP.  
 
Keywords Climate change, Carbon disclosure project, GHG, Corporate social 
responsibility, Women on corporate board 
 
Paper type Research paper 
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There is growing scientific evidence that carbon emissions are the major cause of global 
warming, which is a serious threat to the quality of human lives (Lash and Wellington, 2007; 
Allen et al., 2009; Luo, et al., 2012; Luo and Tang, 2014a; Luo and Tang, 2014b). According 
to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), average temperatures have 
already risen by 0.850C since 1880 (Luo and Tang, 2016). We are expected to experience 
significant increases in surface temperatures and atmospheric CO2 concentrations. In 
addition, sea levels are projected to rise between 26 and 81 centimetres by 2100 (IIPCC, 
2013). Therefore, corporations are expected to play an important role in stabilising climate 
change and in the control of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (interchangeably use the terms 
as ‘carbon’, ‘carbon dioxide CO2’). This is essential for sustainable corporate development. 
Therefore, there is a growing demand for carbon-related information (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2010; Rankin et al., 2011; Luo and Tang, 
2016). A variety of actions have been taken around the world to deal with GHG emissions.  
Some examples are the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the Kyoto Protocol, 
Australian Emissions Trading Scheme (AETS) and Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).  
This study explores the impact women on the corporate board of directors have on climate 
disclosure. It uses CDP’s, a nongovernmental and not-for-profit organization, ‘carbon-related 
disclosure score (CDS)’ in determining the extent to which global companies proactively 
address the climate change agenda and whether board diversity has a positive impact on this 
reporting process. The importance of this study derives from competing views such as 
women on corporate board can bring distinctive management style to improve board’s 
effectiveness, or women’s limited experience in leadership positions could have negative 
effect for board’s work practices (Nielsen and Huse, 2010). The strategic decision-making 
literature recognizes the composition of boards of directors as an important factor in 
corporate decision making (Post et al., 2011; Fuente et al., 2017). Surveys have revealed that 
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a significant majority of board members view their role as determining the strategic direction 
of the company (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). The role of women in board positions is also 
receiving increased attention in recent decades (Daily et al., 1999; Hillman et al., 2007; 
Terjesen et al., 2009; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014; Ben-Amar et 
al., 2015; Liao et al., 2015; Hoang et al., 2016). The literature has shown that women usually 
have a higher perception of risks and have been socialised to care for the needs of others.  
Based on these qualities, they have a closer feeling towards social responsibility (Ciocirlan 
and Pettersson, 2012). Women are also more likely to provide socially desirable responses 
and to be more sensitive to ethical issues than men (Bernardi, 2006). In order to understand 
the effect that women have on boards, it is important to consider not only their presence, but 
also their number. Given this fact, researchers (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; 
Lio et al., 2014; Ben-Amar, et al., 2015) have examined the effect of gender diversity on 
GHG emissions disclosures with mixed results.  
For example, Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) do not find any effect of gender 
diversity in the boardroom on GHG disclosures based on a sample of 283 companies for the 
CDP 2008 project. In contrast, Liao et al. (2014) report a positive effect of female presence 
on 2010 carbon disclosures in the United Kingdom (UK), and Ben-Amar et al. (2015) find 
that female boardroom participation is positively related to the voluntary disclosure of 
climate change information based on a sample of Canadian firms over the 2008–2014 period. 
They also reveal that board gender diversity with more than two women directors influences 
board disclosures on GHG emission levels and climate change strategies. However, our study 
is different from the previous three studies with regards to the extended sample and global 
perspective. It, therefore, contributes to the understanding of whether women can influence 
the board by addressing current climate change risk issues as pressures come from different 
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stakeholders such as regulatory authorities, policy makers, international organisations and the 
media.  
This study contributes to the literature on board diversity and climate change risk discourse in 
several ways. First, we analyse the relationship between female representation on corporate 
boards and CDP scores from an international context covering 33 countries, since it is the 
firm’s decision to voluntarily disclose climate change related risk information and 
opportunities that have been requested by CDP as an institutional stakeholder. Institutional 
investors are actively seeking change on board diversity and climate change disclosure.  
Therefore, they need to explore how board gender diversity may shape corporate response to 
institutional investors’ demands for increased public reporting about climate change risks 
(Ben-Amar et al., 2015). This is important because GHG emissions and public disclosure to 
investors can be assumed as a first step toward addressing climate change issues and reducing 
the company’s carbon footprint (Hoffman, 2005; Kolk and Pinkse, 2007; Reid and Toffel, 
2009; Bocken and Allwood, 2012). Although Ben-Amar et al. (2015) examine this issue in 
the sample of 541 Canadian firms, our investigation is not limited to a specific country.  By 
contrast, our study of climate change is global in nature.  
Second, the study emphasises that an effective diversified board is necessary to address issues 
raised by various stakeholders in relation to climate change risk disclosure. This concept 
contributes to the corporate governance literature since we investigate firm level board 
diversification. Corporate governance mechanisms encourage firms to disclose voluntary 
information about carbon emissions. From a study of global companies and different 
economic environments, it is imperative to observe whether corporate governance 
mechanisms address carbon emission disclosure and to what extent they do this. Third, our 
paper also contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature on climate change disclosure 
scores by CDP rather than general sustainability disclosures. The CDP data are derived from 
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a set of complete questionnaires (Luo et al., 2012), while sustainability disclosure data relies 
on annual reports, sustainability reports, environmental reports and company websites (Post 
et al., 2011; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014; Seto´-Pamies, 2015).  The CDP report is a stand-
alone carbon statement that requires the company to provide comprehensive and specific 
carbon information (Luo and Tang, 2014). In the absence of internationally accepted 
standards, the CDP has adopted a set of rules that participating firms must follow and thus 
significantly reduces the opportunity for managers to manipulate carbon data (Luo and Tang, 
2014). Finally, the findings of the study may contribute to the understanding of regulators and 
policy makers about taking steps forward in accommodating women directorship in the board 
and to what extent.  This will provide firms with direction, either mandatorily or voluntarily 
to include women in the board of directors. For example, in the UK, FTSE 100 boards should 
aim for a minimum of 25% female representation by 2015.  The European Commission has 
set a 40% target for female representation by 2020, while the Australian ASX Corporate 
Governance Council recommends that companies establish a policy concerning diversity and 
disclose in their annual reports, the proportion of women in the whole organisation, in senior 
executive positions and on the board (Ben-Amare et al., 2015). 
Within this context and based on the discussion above, the present study develops the 
following hypotheses in terms of management’s motivation about carbon emission disclosure 
and the strategies to deal with climate change in response to the CDP survey. This study uses 
the lens of gender to explore the role of director preferences in the selection of corporate 
strategies with regard to corporate climate change risk issues.   
2. Theoretical orientations 
The social responsibility of businesses has been influenced by various theories (Carroll and 
Buchholtz, 2000). In this study, we have developed our theoretical orientations in the lens of 
corporate governance and diversity as well as stakeholder theory and resource dependence 
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theory. In other words, we need to explore how diversity especially on the number of women 
on boards contributes to corporate governance mechanism and also how it reflects to the CDP 
score. In recent years, corporate governance reforms emphasise diversity in boardrooms 
(Davies Report, 2015; European Commission, 2014; Higgs Report, 2003). Also increased 
demand for gender diversity on boards has led researchers to examine the factors which 
influence the presence of women directors in the boardrooms (Saeed et al. 2016). The 
presence of female directors on boards can reinforce mechanisms of stakeholder engagement 
(Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2016) and increase the credibility of corporate reports (Manetti and 
Toccafondi, 2012).The arguments for increasing the number of women on boards can be 
grouped into three categories: theoretical, moral and business arguments (Walt and Ingley, 
2003). In terms of theoretical arguments for board diversity are based on the question of 
whom the board should report to, whose interests it protects and by whom the board can be 
held accountable (Lückerath-Rovers, 2009), which include agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978) and stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  
The above theories have different approach on the role of the board (monitoring versus 
advice, shareholders versus stakeholders), and the importance of the independency of 
directors. So, diversity is argued to improve independency while people with a different 
gender, ethnicity or cultural background might ask questions. Therefore, gender is argued, as 
one of the most-debated diversity issues in the corporate governance literature, and, given 
that women are expected to offer value that is different from that of men, numerous calls 
have been made to increase the number of women on boards (Singh et al. 2008; Terjesen et 
al. 2009) be posed by directors with more traditional backgrounds (Carter et al., 2003). 
Regarding moral argument, it is based on the social responsibility of companies and their 
boards such as being a good corporate citizen (Walt and Ingley, 2003; Lückerath-Rovers, 
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2009; Carroll, 1991, Galbreath, 2016). The moral obligations of businesses to society begin 
with its obligations to uphold the perfect rights afforded in its stakeholder relationships 
(Brown and Forster, 2013). Carver (2002) argues that the rationale for diversity in the 
boardroom lies within the concept of ownership and the [moral] obligation of boards in their 
stewardship role. Representing ownership requires that a board represent the diversity within 
the ownership (Walt and Ingley, 2003). According to Carver (2002), in the bracket of 
humankind and human opinion in the ownership to find its way into governance, which 
constitute the board to be a reflection of the ownership as social justice is a dominant 
governance value. Thus, the stakeholder theory has grown into a theory for both corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility (Kaptein and Wempe, 2002, Walt and Ingley, 
2003. Finally, the improvement of company performance is used as a business argument for 
diversity. Diverse groups consider a greater range of perspectives and generate more high-
quality solutions. This could ultimately lead to higher company performance and company 
value (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004; Kang et al., 2007). 
Lückerath-Rovers (2009) argue that both stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory 
question who should serve on corporate boards in order to give the board legitimacy, and to 
what extent this contributes to corporate governance and thus, a brief discussions on 
theoretical orientations is made in the following paragraphs.  
2.1 Stakeholder theory  
The underlying rationale behind GHG emission disclosures has been enunciated under 
various socio-political and non-social political theories (Patten, 2002), of which stakeholder 
theory is particularly appropriate. Researchers advocate that stakeholder theory is 
fundamental to the study of business and society (Galbreath, 2016; Liao et al., 2015; 
Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 2014). Stakeholder theory is based 
on the premise that an organisation has many stakeholders rather than a single group of 
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shareholders, or groups of financial stakeholders, such as creditors (Momin, 2013). As an 
organisation needs to manage its relationship with many stakeholder groups that affect, or are 
affected by, its business decisions (Clarkson, 1995; Freeman, 1984), therefore, such 
relationships produce different arguments, leading to a number of variations of the 
stakeholder theory (Momin, 2013). The literature discusses three main variants of stakeholder 
theory: a normative (ethical), a managerial (instrumental) and the descriptive versions. 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Jamali, 2008). The normative variant suggests that 
management might address stakeholder concerns from an accountability perspective, the 
instrumental and descriptive variants suggest that businesses might manage powerful 
stakeholders strategically by identifying them with the self-interest of the business 
(Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Momin, 2013). Within the stakeholder model, several groups of 
stakeholders have expressed their concern about the absence of women board directors 
(Hillman et al., 2007). Moreover, Al-Shaer and Zaman (2016) argued that female directors 
are more likely to be stakeholder oriented, concerned about ethical practices and socially 
responsible behaviour and also be inclined to take actions to reduce perceived risks (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003). They find that gender diverse boards are associated 
with higher quality sustainability reports. Nielsen and Huse (2010) also argued that women 
on board can reduce the level of conflict and ensure high quality of board development 
activities and strategic decision. 
In the context of this study, Liao et al. (2015) argue that “GHG emissions are ubiquitous and 
persistent, and the climate-change legislation may influence a firm either directly or 
indirectly, and favourably or unfavourably” (p. 412). Authors also argue that in order to have 
far-reaching impact on their future development, firms must make strategic decisions. The 
extent of a company’s social disclosure depends on its social performance (Ullmann, 1985).  
In this case, social performance refers to an organisation’s responses to anticipated or existing 
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social demands (Strand, 1983). Managers continually encounter demands from multiple 
stakeholder groups to devote resources to corporate social responsibility (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2001). Hence, stakeholders need to be managed to maintain their continued support 
and ultimately ensure that corporate objectives and strategic decisions are taken which 
consider existing social demands as well as recognize the relevance of multiple stakeholders 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). 
Therefore, this implies that companies have identified their target audience and are providing 
information that will influence (or distract from) this group (Gray et al., 1996). Moreover, it 
is argued that organizations could not survive if they were not responsive to the demands of 
the groups in their environments, who are thus enabled to influence organizational outcomes 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In this case, women are more sensitive to social and ethical 
issues (Bear et al., 2010; Hafsi and Turgut, 2013; Isidro and Sobral, 2015; Al-Shaer and 
Zaman, 2016). It is thus likely that due to females’ higher concerns for social responsibility 
issues and greater stakeholder orientation a gender diverse board may affect sustainability 
reporting quality (Al-Shaer and Zaman, 2016, p. 212) which might have positive impact in 
the CDP project. 
2.2 Resource dependence theory 
Resource dependence theory offers the rationale for the board’s function of providing critical 
resources to the firm including legitimacy, advice, and counsel (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
These board resources offer the corporation support in understanding and responding to its 
environment (Boyd, 1990) that can help it better manage CSR issues (Bear et al., 2010). 
Moreover, resource dependence has two major implications regarding boards of directors. 
First, composition of the board should be affected by environmental pressures and demands. 
Second, differences in board composition should affect a firm’s performance (Boyd, 1990). 
As we are concerned in this study environmental issue, i.e. climate change, therefore, our 
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discussion is limited to the first concern. Indeed, from the perspective of resource dependence 
theory, the board of directors is a primary linking mechanism for connecting a firm with 
external resources (Hillman et al., 2007). In addition, as per stakeholder model, the board of 
directors might be a linking mechanism for connecting a firm with external stakeholders 
(Lückerath-Rovers, 2009).  
In the context of resource dependence theory, using the board of directors as a linkage 
mechanism towards stakeholders provides companies with at least four benefits (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978, p.145): firstly, linkage may provide the organisation with useful information, 
secondly, linkage provides a channel for communication purposes, thirdly, linkage is an 
important step in obtaining commitments of support from important elements of the 
environment and fourthly, linkage has a value in legitimizing organisations (Lückerath-
Rovers, 2009). Hillman et al., (2007) add that legitimacy and conformity to societal 
expectations are considered key components of organisational survival.  
In this study, the focus will be on the fourth benefit of board linking: providing legitimacy to 
an organisation. Resource dependence argues that external pressures- such as competition, 
regulation, and social forces-will cause firms to seek out environmental linkage which is 
measured by board size (Boyd, 1990). In this case, CDP scores might have influence from the 
board’s role as corporate boards do respond to environmental pressures and demands. 
Moreover, board’s influence on CSR is facilitated by the activities of monitoring and support 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), which are dependent upon specialised human capital resources. 
Therefore monitoring at the board level is an activity that requires the oversight of 
management, corporate resources, and firms’ outcomes. However, effective boards do more 
than monitoring; they also advise. Their advice can assist management to make high-quality 
decisions (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). The presence of women directors has been linked to 
various outcomes and having women on boards does exert some influence on non-financial 
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performance and in particular CSR (Stanwick and Stanwick 1998; Wang and Coffey 1992; 
Williams 2003; Bernardi and Threadgill, 2010; Smith et al., 2001; Siciliano, 1996). In 
addition, women are more oriented toward supporting and maintaining relationships than men 
(Hisrich and Brush 1984), are strong in the areas of idea generation and innovation (Rosener 
1995), and have been noted as having higher moral and ethical atonement than men (Betz et 
al. 1989). Therefore, women through their specialised human capital, bring a high level of 
skill at idea generation and innovation (Triana et al., 2013; Torchia et al. 2011), both of 
which would be expected to help boards to make appropriate and necessary decisions to 
improve CSR. Here, the resources offered by women are expected to help boards, enabling 
them to innovate more readily around CSR initiatives. The resources of women on boards are 
also expected to be engaged to carefully consider and respond to stakeholders who have 
varied interests in the firm, such as environmental and social interests (Galbreath, 2016). 
2.3 Agency theory 
Based on Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s agency theory, Barnea and Rubin (2010) consider 
CSR engagement as a principal-agent relation between managers and shareholders (Li et al., 
2016). Moreover, agency theory explains how principals efficiently organise exchanges with 
agents by employing mechanisms  - incentive alignment and monitoring - in appropriate 
combinations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and also hold their organisations 
to higher ethical standards (Pan and Sparks 2012). However, in order to avoid the agency 
conflict, the management should avoid the cost of dealing with environment problems, 
namely, reducing high-energy consumption, activities to reduce GHG emission, and air and 
water treatment before being released to the environment (Terjesen et al., 2016). In other 
words, agents or the firm management would carry out such activities to benefit them, 
however, in return, it will be at the cost of the shareholders. Firms need to take up activities 
and initiatives to tackle the known global warming issues and impose solutions to minimize 
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the impact on the environment (Amran et al., 2014). Climate change disclosure is one way of 
providing evidence, which can increase the confidence of the stakeholders. Therefore, the 
firms should use sustainability reporting to publicise to stakeholders that individual firms are 
undertaking activities to curb global warming issues (Amran et al., 2014). Hence, to mitigate 
the agency dispute between the agent and principal, additional disclosure in reporting will 
ease the increasing concern. It is the firms’ duty to handle the climate change issue in a more 
professional manner to avoid an unfavourable image and legal expenses, (i.e. agency cost). 
There is evidence that boards with more women have greater levels of public disclosure (Gul 
et al. 2011) and research supports that women’s ability to influence board decisions increases 
with their numbers, particularly boards with more than one woman (Fondas and Sassalos 
2000). 
2.4 Discussion on theoretical underpinning  
The above discussion leads us to posit that the CDP’s score may be affected by the gender 
diversity on board under the umbrella of above theories. It is also noted that the current 
literature emphasises the importance of carbon relevant risk disclosure of firms given the 
planetary boundaries, which are perceived as resource scarcity (Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005; 
Islam and Deegan, 2008; Liao et al., 2015: Guenther et al., 2016). Therefore, it is useful for a 
firm to be held accountable to the relevant stakeholders who have a stake in knowing how the 
resources entrusted to a firm are used (Schaltegger and Burritt, 2000), to obtain a “contract to 
continue its operations” (Deegan, 2002, p. 293). Guenther et al., (2016) discuss another issue 
of ‘stakeholder salience’ (Neville et al., 2011) in explaining stakeholder relevance in relation 
to carbon disclosure. Eesley and Lenox (2006, p. 765) define salience “in terms of whether 
firms are likely to respond to stakeholder requests for action and by proposing that power, 
legitimacy, and urgency arise out of the nature of stakeholder–request–firm triplets”. Carbon 
disclosure is a way of satisfying salient stakeholders and reflects an adaptive management 
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approach to address a dynamic, multidimensional environment, and an ability to meet social 
pressure and respond to societal needs (Hackston and Milne, 1996). Moreover, Liao et al. 
(2015) argue that agency and legitimacy theories, although widely applied, are inadequate to 
explain GHG-reporting phenomena. Therefore, in this context, stakeholder and resource 
dependence theories are a more valid theoretical perspective, because the preferences of one 
interest group with regard to climate-change activities may not be congruent with those of 
other groups (Liao et al., 2015). Indeed, stakeholders are a common antecedent, moderator or 
mediator variable (Guenther and Hoppe, 2014) in the related research field of corporate 
environmental (carbon) disclosure (Clarkson et al., 2008; Huang and Kung, 2010). On the 
hand, within the framework of resource dependence theory, women on board brings 
specialised human capital (Miller and Triana, 2013) and help board to address the 
environmental concern with particular in climate change risk issue in the CDP project. 
3.  Related literature and Hypotheses development  
The CDP has made significant contributions in obtaining greater corporate disclosure of risks 
related to climate change (McFarland, 2009). Its voluntary efforts encourage standardised 
voluntary reporting for companies to provide investors with relevant information about 
climate change-related business risk (Kolk et al., 2008). The intention to provide this climate 
change-related business risk information depends on the board of directors since it is a 
company’s main governance body and acts the entity responsible for safeguarding the 
interests of the stakeholders in the company by carrying out its duties (Hill and Jones, 1992; 
Prado-Lorenzo, and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010).   
3. 1 Gender diversity 
Diversity is a characteristic of an organization’s board of directors, which is related to the 
existence of differences in its members’ traits (Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010). 
Gender diversity is one of the more interesting human aspects that has been the focus of 
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many studies (Willims, 2003; Nalikka, 2009; Lückerath-Rovers, 2009; Adams, and Ferreira, 
2009; Post et al. 2011; Bear et al., 2010; Fernandez‐Feijoo et al., 2014; Al-Shaer and Zaman, 
2016; Chen et al., 2016; Galbreath, 2016; Liao et al., 2015; Rao and Tilt, 2016; Saeed et al., 
2016). This is because diversity among board directors improves the chances that different 
knowledge domains, perspectives and ideas will be considered in the decision-making 
process (Post et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2015).  The board of directors is primarily responsible 
for monitoring the behaviour of management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Board directors are 
also participating more actively in decision making about corporate environmental policies 
(Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002). Boards influence firm performance (Peng, 2004), strategic 
decision making (Golden and Zajac, 2001; Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Westphal and 
Fredrickson, 2001), internationalization strategies (Datta, et al., 2009), R&D investment 
strategies (Kor, 2006), share price (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002), CSR (Frias‐Aceituno et 
al., 2013; Post et al., 2011), sustainability reporting (Amran et al., 2014; Al-Shaer and 
Zaman, 2016) and corporate governance (Farber, 2005; Monem, 2014). 
Board gender diversity could improve the quality of board discussions and increase the 
ability of the board to provide better oversight of the firm's disclosures and reports.  It could 
also reduce board effectiveness by increasing internal divisiveness and constraining its ability 
to act (Gul et al., 2011). The study of Lückerath-Rovers (2009) indicate that the presence of 
female directors on company boards provides legitimacy to the outside world regarding the 
company’s values on diversity. Saeed et al. (2016) observe that board gender diversity is 
positively related to the firm size, and it is inversely related to corporate risk across both 
emerging and developed economies. Galbreath (2016) suggests based on secondary data from 
Australia’s largest firms that the resources of outsiders and women on boards appear to 
complement each other in impacting on CSR. Al-Shaer and Zaman, (2016) find that gender 
diverse boards are associated with higher quality sustainability reports and independent 
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female directors have greater effect on sustainability reporting quality than male directors. 
Chen et al. (2016) suggest that female directors improve board effectiveness in risk 
management with respect to R&D investment. Rao and Tilt (2016) observe that board 
composition seems to be a major factor which can be assumed to have some influence on 
both CSR activities and CSR reporting. The study of Bear et al. (2010) extends current theory 
by demonstrating that the number of women on the board has a positive relationship with the 
strength ratings for CSR. Saeed et al. (2016) note that board gender diversity is positively 
related to the firm size, and it is inversely related to corporate risk across both emerging and 
developed economies.  
There are also differences in the company board of directors’ decision making, including 
CSR policies, due to its gender composition (Fernandez‐Feijoo et al., 2014). Introducing 
gender diversity to corporate boards also has important implications for board dynamics 
(Ruigrok et al., 2007). Women bring different characteristics to boards where they are 
perceived to have a more participative, democratic, and communal leadership style (Eagly et 
al., 2003; Eagly and Johnson 1990; Rudman and Glick 2001). This may lead to improve 
board effectiveness as a result of the improved quality of board deliberations and better 
supervision of the firm’s disclosures (Gul et al., 2011). Gul et al. (2011) argue that gender-
diverse boards improve the quality of public disclosure through better monitoring. The 
current literature also suggests that female directors provide greater oversight and monitoring 
of managers’ actions and reports (Hillman et al., 2007; Adams and Ferreira, 2009) through 
promoting better board attendance,  assuming monitoring positions on audit, nominating, and 
corporate governance committees, and demanding greater accountability from managers for 
poor performance (Gul et al., 2011). Gender diversity has also been found to facilitate 
creativity within groups (Hoffman and Maier, 1961; Nemeth, 1986). By taking a broader 
view, the board will have a better understanding of the complexities of the business 
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environment and thus improve decision-making. A more gender diverse board may also 
improve a firm’s competitive advantage if it improves the firm’s image (Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008). 
Academic research has advanced gender board composition from different perspectives and 
with different results. A comprehensive discussion, especially about women directors on 
corporate boards, is included in the study of Terjesen et al. (2009). Their study supports the 
position that women directors contribute to important firm level outcomes since they play 
direct roles as leaders, mentors, and network members as well as indirect roles as symbols of 
opportunity for other women. They inspire them to achieve and stay with their firms. Willims 
(2003) finds that female directors may be more inclined to use the firm’s profit to help others, 
i.e. engage in charitable giving activities based on 185 Fortune 500 companies in 1994. 
Webb (2004) tests the effect of gender composition of the board on a range of measures of 
social responsibility including environmental responsiveness. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
suggests that female directors have a significant impact on board governance, i.e. board 
inputs and firm outcomes based on 1,939 firms for the period 1996-2003. Post et al., (2011) 
find that the boards with a higher proportion of outsiders and those with three or more female 
directors have more favourable environmental disclosure strength scores, based on a sample 
of 78 companies (only electronic and chemical)  that were on the list of 2006 and 2007 
Fortune 1000 companies. The study by Liao et al. (2015) suggests that the small number of 
female directors make a difference in GHG disclosure decisions in the sample of the 329 
largest companies in the United Kingdom based on 2011 CDP data.  
Given the evidence, some scholars have argued that women’s more protective attitude toward 
the environment is due to their reproductive role, while others have argued that, as a group, 
women may be more aware of environmental exploitation because of their experience in a 
cultural system of paternalistic exploitation (Wehrmeyer and McNeil, 2000). A large body of 
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evidence supports the view that women are more concerned than men about perceived health 
and environmental risks (Bord and O’Connor, 1997; Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996). 
Accumulated research findings show that women tend to express higher levels of concern 
about technology and the environment than do men (Davidson and Freudenburg, 1996). 
Moreover, women receive more positive rewards than men for altruistic behaviour including 
caring and concern for others (Gilligan, 1982). The topic of female intelligence was 
addressed in 19th century psychology via phrenology and the neuroanatomists (Shields, 
1975). Haier et al. (2005) study finds that on neuroanatomical basis, the general level of 
intelligence is the same in men and women. However, the psychology of women in acquiring 
the character of an academic entity was witnessed by the proliferation of research on sex 
differences (Shields, 1975). Women are typically socialized into communal values reflecting 
a concern for others, selflessness, and a desire to be at one with others. Men are usually 
socialized into agentic values involving self-expansion, self-assertion, competence and 
mastery (Eagly, 1987). As a result, women tend to be more aware and concerned than men 
about the links between environmental harm and personal well-being (Stern et al., 1993). 
It has also been argued that women’s experience of motherhood gives them a heightened 
sense of morality that contributes to a more responsible and ethical use of power and 
authority (Sinclair, 1998). In this regard, in the typical masculine environments driven by 
competition, individualism, hierarchy and technical outcomes, feminine values are commonly 
viewed as being based on mutual empowerment, empathy and authenticity (Dillard and 
Reynolds, 2008). Tremblay et al. (2016) argue that if such gender-based sensitivity and skills 
really exist, then the economic logic of efficiency should lead businesses to diversify their 
boards’ gender composition. In addition, a meta-analysis of gender differences in moral 
orientation (Jaffee and Hype, 2000) shows that women are somewhat more likely than men to 
use care reasoning. However, men and women use similar principles of fairness and equity 
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(Post et al., 2011). It can be argued, therefore, female participation in the boardroom 
increases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of climate change-related risks in the CDP. 
Therefore, the main hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between gender diversity and carbon disclosure score. 
 
3.2 Size of the Board of Directors: 
Board of directors have recently received considerable attention, in both practitioner and 
academic venues (Fama and Jenson, 1983; Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Boeker and 
Goodstein, 1991; Goodstein and Boeker, 1991; Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Hillman et 
al., 2000; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Rose, 2007; Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez, 2010; 
Liao et al., 2015 and Ben-Amar et al., 2015). The board of directors plays a key role in 
monitoring management and in constructing mechanisms that align managers’ objectives 
with shareholders’ interests (Armstrong et al., 2015). They also play a crucial role in 
corporate policy formulation, as well as its implementation and reviews (William, 2003). 
From an institutional perspective, larger boards are assumed to be beneficial (Judge and 
Zeithaml, 1992). Jensen (1993) argues that boards with more than about seven to eight 
members are unlikely to be effective.  
The allocation of decision (or control) rights within an organization is a fundamental building 
block of organizational structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1990). Therefore, the size of board is 
important because larger boards are more likely to include more qualified directors (in terms 
of education and business experience) and, therefore, allow board members to offer the 
management high-quality advice (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Lu et al. (2015) argue that this 
could contribute to the firm’s image and relationships with stakeholders.  However, their 
findings do not support that hypothesis. Nevertheless, scholars have found a larger board to 
be better (Gales and Kesner, 1994; Dalton et al., 1999). In this case, the climate change risk 
issue could be considered by larger number of board members as their background skills 
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(education, experience) help of understanding and evaluating a firm’s social roles ( Chang et 
al., 2015). They can bring a wealth of knowledge and experience to the board and can also 
increase the element of independence and objectivity in the board’s strategic decision-making 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Having more directors also increases the pool of expertise and 
advice that executives can capitalize on. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) contend that “for 
proponents of resource dependency, larger boards increase the company’s ability to deal with 
environmental uncertainty and to form links with business partners” (p. 172). Ruigrok et al. 
(2006) argue that if environmental complexity and uncertainty have risen, boards have to deal 
with higher information-processing demands. They find that one way of meeting this demand 
is to enlarge the board size. In our context, CPD’s concerned with global warming or 
reduction of GHG emissions, firms need to invest in green technology in order to create long-
term economic value through energy savings and improved environmental image. Therefore, 
carbon pollution control is largely considered a social responsibility (Liao et al., 2015) and 
the directors’ collective decisions (Luo and Tang, 2014). These observations imply that 
having larger number of directors on a board with diversified directors’ knowledge could 
limit the board’s ability to contribute to the strategy development process. This leads us to 
our second hypothesis.  
H2:    There is a positive relationship between board size and carbon disclosure score. 
 
3.3 CEO duality  
The situation where the CEO is also the chairman of the board is called CEO duality 
(Ruigrok et al., 2006; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). From an agency perspective (Fama, 1980), 
CEO duality involves an inherent role conflict for the CEO-chair and enhances the power of 
the CEO relative to the board. This compromises the board's functions of monitoring and 
disciplining the CEO (Tang, 2016). Boards of directors are charged with ensuring that CEOs 
carry out their duties in a way that serves the best interests of shareholders (Finkelstein and 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 A
uc
kl
an
d 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
A
t 1
8:
13
 1
8 
Se
pt
em
be
r 2
01
7 
(P
T)
20 
 
D'aveni, 1994). Duality offers the clear direction of a single leader, and a resulting faster 
response to external events (Boyd, 1995, p. 301). Proponents of duality also characterise the 
board chair position as ‘being relatively less powerful and more ceremonial and symbolic 
than the CEO’s position’ (Harries et al., 1988, p. 214). In a review of the CEO duality 
literature, Krause et al. (2015, p. 268) conclude that “the literature has produced almost no 
evidence suggesting that CEO duality reduces a board’s ability to hold its CEO accountable”. 
The literature also suggests that duality enables the CEOs to pursue their own agenda due to 
greater power and influence over firm decision-making. However, that power does not reduce 
their vulnerability to dismissal (Martin et al., 2017). As a key organizational decision 
maker, CEOs evidently hold greater accountability and take initiative regarding 
corporate social responsibility policies (Oh et al., 2014). It is also likely that CEO duality 
increases the CEO’s bargaining power (Monem, 2013).  
However, agency theory is more critical towards CEO duality (Ruigrok et al., 2006). Their 
assumptions rely on three issues: first, the CEO-chairman is responsible for organizing board 
meetings which gives the CEO a significant influence on the meeting agenda and on the 
information provided to directors (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Second, duality gives the CEO 
more influence on the nomination of new directors or executives (Westphal and Zajac, 1995). 
Third, as companies face increasing environmental instability, the separation of the two roles 
might be one way to cope with higher information processing demands. Therefore, if a CEO 
is too powerful it hinders outside directors from opposing and challenging strategic 
propositions of the CEO (Golden and Zajac, 2001). We, therefore, argue that a strong CEO 
arising from the CEO duality will have a negative impact on strategic board involvement and 
we arrive at our third hypothesis. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and the carbon disclosure score. 
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4. Research Design 
4.1 Sample and Data 
We use CDP’s data together with firm characteristics and corporate governance data for 2011 
to 2013 for companies by searching the Bloomberg data set. Several previous research studies 
on the CDP database were completed for the 2007 to 2010 time period. Our sample is 
extended to the 2011-2013 periods. The total observations for the three year period are 1175 
companies. However, based on corporate governance and firm characteristics data 
availability for the model, our sample includes 331 companies from 10 industry sectors in 33 
countries with firms in 12 geographical locations (see Appendix). Table 1 shows the sample 
size and the sample selection procedures for the study. 
Table 1: Sample size and sample selection 
Number of firms available in the CDP data set (2011-13)  1175  
Less, Missing data for empirical tests 844  
Total number of firms in the sample                                        331  
Industry sector No. of firms Percentage  
Consumer discretionary 50 15.10 
Consumer staples 39 11.77 
Energy 16 4.83 
Financials 52 15.70 
Health care 36 10.87 
Industrials 39 11.77 
Information technology 51 15.40 
Telecommunication services 04 1.21 
Materials 23 7.00 
Utilities 21 6.35 
Total  331 100 
 
 
5. Research Design and Variables 
5. 1 Model 
 
We test the hypotheses of this study by employing the main regression model as below. Table 
2 provides a description/definition of our dependent, independent, and control variables. 
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CDP Score =  + 1 WOB + 2 BSIZE + 3 CEODU + 4 BOM + 5 TOBQ + 6 ROA + 7  
R&D + 8 ENGC + 9 TAS +     
 
Table 2: Description of dependent, independent and control variable and expected sign 
Dependent variable  
CDP Score: The company's carbon disclosure score (CDS), measured by Carbon Disclosure project 
(CDP) 
Independent variables Sign Definition 
WOB + Number of women directors in the board 
BSIZE + Number of members in the board 
CEODU - If CEO is the chair of the board of directors 
Control variables 
BOM + 
Number of board meetings held during the calendar 
year 
TOBQ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
Tobin’s Q is the total market value of the company 
based on the year end price and the number of shares 
outstanding, plus preferred stock, book value of long 
term debt and current liabilities, divided by the book 
value of total assets.  
 
ROA + Return of asset 
R&D + 
 
Research & development expenditure divided by total 
asset 
 
ENGC + Amount of energy consumed by a particular firm 
TAS + 
 
Natural logarithm of the company's total assets 
 
 
5. 2 Dependent variable 
This study uses the carbon disclosure scores of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) from 
2011 to 2013 (inclusive). We have selected the CDP as the base of our sample given the fact 
that the CDP is an independent non-profit entity that facilitates the collection of emission-
related data for institutional investors and they provide data for major global companies.  The 
CDP was formulated in response to institutional shareholder requests for firm-specific 
greenhouse gas (GHG) information. Each year, CDP asks the top executive managers of the 
world’s largest public companies to disclose information about the risks and opportunities 
posed by climate change, the strategies being pursued to address them, and company-wide 
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greenhouse gas emissions. Their questionnaire focuses on how the company is affected by 
global warming or by the need to reduce its emissions of GHG. The CDP questionnaire 
covers five sections: Risks and Opportunities, Emissions Accounting, Verification and 
Trading, Carbon Reduction Performance, and Climate Change Governance (CDP Report, 
2013). The disclosure score assesses the completeness and quality of a company’s response. 
Its purpose is to provide a summary of the extent to which companies have answered CDP’s 
questions in a structured format. A high disclosure score signals that a company provided 
comprehensive information about the measurement and management of its carbon footprint, 
its climate change strategy and risk management processes and outcomes (CDP Report, 
2015). A score (from 0 to 100) is applied to most of the company responses to the CDP, 
which are assessed for disclosure and performance. On the basis of firm response, the CDP 
prepares a carbon disclosure score (CDS) which is publicly available.  
5. 3 Independent and control variables 
The main variable of interest of the study is women directors on the board (WOB) and their 
influence on CDP disclosure. Our sample includes only firms having women’s presence on 
corporate boards to observe their specific effects on CDP disclosure after separating from 
firms without women director on the board. Therefore, our focus is particularly on the role of 
women on the board in the climate change disclosure. Since women on the board (WOB) is 
integral part of the board structure, without the functions of the board women director cannot 
influence or make a difference in decision making process. The number of female directors 
and their share among board members are important in this regard to play a role along with 
other members in the board including the CEO being the chairman of the board. CEO with 
chairman role attached becomes more powerful than any other board members. Therefore, we 
have included both board size (BSIZE) and CEO duality (CEODU) as independent variables 
in the regression model to see whether women directors’ role on CDP disclosure is mediated 
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by other board variables or not. As such hypotheses are developed for these three 
independent variables in reference to related literature in Section 3.  
In regards to control variables, previous studies (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Brammer and 
Millington, 2009; Bear et al., 2010; Galbreath, 2011; Post et al., 2011; Setó‐Pamies, 2015) 
argue that firm size and profitability, can exert influence on a firm’s responsible behaviour. 
We control firm size (TAS) and profitability (ROA and TOBQ) variables in our study. Firm 
size is controlled with a measurement of total tangible assets, and is transformed 
logarithmically due to the positively skewed distribution. The firm’s success is explained by 
its performance over a certain period of time (Bauwhede, 2009). There is evidence that a 
firm’s financial performance strongly influences its level of social responsibility.  This is 
because a firm with higher profits also has more resources to spend on the quantity and 
quality of carbon disclosure (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). According to slack resources 
theory (Waddock and Graves 1997), higher levels of CSR might be driven by better financial 
conditions such as high profitability. In contrast, Tobin’s Q refers to a market value measure 
of expected long-run firm performance (Bozec et al., 2010). ROA only reflects past corporate 
performance. However, Tobin’s Q has the advantage of reflecting shareholders’ share. This 
makes it easier to compare companies which reflect future profit through an evaluation of 
investors (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). We, therefore, include this control variable because it is 
forward-looking and is a reflection of the expectations of the shareholders concerning the 
firm’s future performance (Hutchinson and Gull, 2004) and corporate social accountability.  
Frequency of board meetings may have an impact on monitoring and strategic decisions 
about carbon emissions. They also allow more time for directors to confer, set strategy, and 
monitor management. If firms have fewer board meetings than are necessary, by 
overemphasizing costs, board meeting frequency will be positively associated with firm value 
(Vafeas, 1999). Conger et al. (1998) also suggest that board meeting time is an important 
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resource in improving the board’s effectiveness. R&D is included as control variable by 
considering how the R&D fits within the firm's overall activities, and by revealing the firm's 
strategic vision (Entwistle, 1999).  It also reflects the extent of information asymmetry 
associated with R&D (Aboody and Lev, 2000). We also include ENGC (energy 
consumption) as a control variable.  This is because it is assumed that economic growth 
depends on energy consumption (Shen and Sun, 2016). The external pressures that are often 
considered as motivation for firms to adopt environmental management practices (Gualandris 
and Kalchschmidt, 2014) and in order to comply with regulatory requirements (Jones, 2010) 
they are grouped into three different institutional isomorphic categories: coercive pressure 
(Zhu et al., 2007), mimetic pressure (Jorgensen et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2013) and normative 
pressure (Zhang et al., 2012; Zhang, Wang & Lai, 2015). In addition, in order to balance 
economic and environmental performance in response to these external pressures, many 
industrial firms have recognized the importance of being low-carbon and environmentally-
proactive by developing and implementing so-called ‘green’ strategies (Fisher-Vanden and 
Thorburn, 2011; Gale, 2006).  
6. Results and discussion 
6. 1 Univariate results and discussion 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of CDP score, corporate governance and financial 
variables. It can be seen in Table 3 that the average CDP scores are 75.45, indicating high 
score for the sample firms.  The average board size is 12 members, which is relatively high, 
with maximum of 25 and minimum 5 members. The women on the boards account for an 
average of 2 members of our sample with maximum 7 and minimum 1 member, which is 
much higher than the figure of 1 reported by Prado-Lorenze and Garcia-Sanchez (2010) in 
2007 CDP data. While CEO duality is 33%, i.e. one-third of the sample firms have CEO-
chair duality, the average board meeting is 10 times in a year. In regards to profitability, 
TOBQ is high while ROA is relatively low at around 7% on average. The R&D mean value is 
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$102,722.67 million while total asset is 6,880,000.00 million and the average energy 
consumption is $32,976 thousands ton.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median SD Min Max 
CDP 75.45 80.00 19.14 0.00 100.00 
WOB 2.36 2.00 1.18 1.00 7.00 
BSIZE 12.41 12.00 3.03 5.00 25.00 
CEODU 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 
BOM 9.72 8.00 7.03 1.00 12.00 
ROA 6.63 5.32 6.47 -24.41 54.72 
TOBQ 1.76 1.36 1.17 0.54 10.26 
R&D (in million $) 102722.67 1182.50 874207.83 0.30 14800000.00 
ENGC ( in thousands Ton) 32976.14 3266.34 90513.39 9.39 778758.00 
TAS ( in Million $) 6880000.00 91192.00 43200000.00 3248.40 733000000.00 
 
Table 4 provides the correlation matrix. The results of pair-wise correlation for CDP score 
and all other variables indicate that multicollinearity is not present. This is because the 
highest significant correlation coefficient is 0.36 between women on board (WOB) and board 
size (BSIZE). According to the table, BSIZE, WOB, CEODU, and BOM variables have 
significant positive correlations with the dependent variable CDP score at a 1% level except 
CEODU which is significant at the 5% level. Since WOB and BSIZE are positively 
associated with CDP score, it indicates that women on board and board size have positive 
effects on firms in dealing with environmental issues and/or climate change related-risk and, 
therefore, participating in the CDP project. However, it is not clear here how CEO duality can 
positively influence social responsibility. The other two performance characteristics 
variables, ROA and TOBQ, are negatively correlated with CDP score. It may be the case that 
carbon emission task is expensive for the sample firms, given that the average ROA is 6.63 in 
Table 3. Although average TOBQ is at good share (i.e. 1.76) in Table 3, market investors 
may not response positively to firm’s carbon emission activities because of the associated 
cost issue.  
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Table 4 Correlation Matrix: 
 CDP BSIZE WOB CEODU ROA TOBQ R&D ENGC Log TAS BOM 
CDP 1.000          
BSIZE 0.095*** 1.000         
WOB 0.123*** 0.362*** 1.000        
CEODU 0.057** -0.036 0.026 1.000       
ROA -0.075*** -0.227*** -0.107*** 0.016 1.000      
TOBQ -0.013 -0.232*** -0.077*** 0.022 0.743 1.000     
ENGC 0.043 -0.010 -.035 0.075*** -0.089*** -0.175*** 1.000    
R&D 0.001 -0.046 0.022 0.035 0.1524*** 0.248*** -0.243*** 1.000   
Log 
TAS 
-0.039 0.068*** 0.034 -0.100*** -0.289*** -0.377*** -0.186*** 0.092*** 1.000  
BOM 0.119*** 0.1352*** 0.101*** -0.376 -0.075*** -0.111*** -0.316*** 0.049 0.220*** 1.000 
***Represent significance at the 1% level; ** Represent significance at the 5% level; * Represent significance 
at the 10% level 
 
6. 2 Multivariate regression results and discussion 
The model is estimated using the fixed-effects estimator since OLS generally leads to biased 
estimates of  (Berkey et al., 1995). Table 5 below presents the regression results in 5 
different models where Model 3 and Model 5 are the final models of the study denoting the 
explanatory power of the model in terms of R2 and F-statistics. In Model 1, we consider 
dependent variable CDP and the main variable of interest women on board (WOB) (i.e. CDP 
Score =  + 1 WOB). The results shows positive significant effect of women (WOB) on 
CDP disclosure, as predicated. In Model 2, we consider CDP and all control variables (i.e. 
CDP Score =  + 1 BOM + 2 TOBQ + 3 ROA + 4 R&D + 5 ENGC + 6 TAS + ), 
which indicates CDP is positive significantly influenced by Tobin’s Q (TOBQ) and firm size 
(TAS) and negatively, though weak, by profitability (ROA). In Models 3, we combine Model 
1 and Model 2 to observe the effect of WOB on CDP in the presence of control variables (i.e. 
CDP Score =  + 1 WOB + 2 BOM + 3 TOBQ + 4 ROA + 5 R&D + 6 ENGC + 7 
TAS + ). Our results confirm significant positive effect of women (WOB) on CDP 
disclosure, as reported in Model 1. Therefore, hypothesis 1 (H1) is accepted, based on 
theoretical directions in Section 2. 
Since women on board is integral part of the board, it is important to see their impact on CDP 
disclosure still exist as the same in the presence of other board members as well as CEO’s 
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dual role as chairman of the board or mediated by other board variables. So, in Models 4, we 
extend Model 1 by adding board size and CEO duality variables (i.e. CDP Score =  + 1 
WOB + 2 BSIZE + 3 CEODU). The findings remain consistent for WOB showing positive 
significant effect on CDP disclosure, while contrary to expectation negative significant effect 
of board size (BSIZE) on CDP and no effect of CEO duality (CEODU) are evident. These 
results indicate that WOB’s role on CDP disclosure is not mediated or influenced by other 
board variables. Women directors can take stand in favour of CDP independently. However, 
we find a strong negative significant relationship between board size (BSIZE) and CDP, 
although following the literature we expected more board members will support more CDP 
disclosure. The CEO duality (CEODU) also reveals insignificant result, though with negative 
sign, while we expected that strong CEO in chairman role of the board would restrain CDP 
disclosure. Thus, hypothesis (H2) and hypothesis 3 (H3) are rejected. 
Table 5: Fixed effects regression results  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Determinant   Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 67.7362*** 
(0.7616) 
-229.2455*** 
(74.7298) 
-167.2564** 
(84.3860) 
107.8108*** 
(14.9204) 
-80.257 
(76.390) 
WOB 
 
3.6368*** 
(1.8944) 
 2.0868** 
(1.0211) 
3.9862*** 
(0.6791) 
3.0490*** 
(1.0262) 
BSIZE 
 
   -16.19*** 
(5.955) 
-14.421* 
(8.2132) 
CEODU  
 
   -0.2225 
(2.52) 
1.4599 
(3.6830) 
BOM  -1.8384 
(3.0255) 
-0.0047 
(0.1415) 
 -0.4115 
(0.1476) 
ROA  -0.2928* 
(0.1787) 
-0.3179* 
(0.1789) 
 -0.2717 
(0.1731) 
TOBQ  9.5193*** 
(2.1722) 
8.7145*** 
(2.2593) 
 9.2446*** 
(2.2706) 
ENGC  1.2696 
(4.2497) 
1.2652 
(4.5859) 
 0.0032*** 
(0.000) 
R&D  -185.9579 
(135.8817) 
-179.3969 
(134.0988) 
 1.3185 
(0.9642) 
TAS  24.8940*** 
(6.3217) 
19.924*** 
(7.6217) 
 14.755** 
(6.6439) 
 R2    = 0.04; 
F-statistic: 
6.39; 
P=0.000 
R2    = 0.16; 
F-statistic: 
5.81; P = 
0.000 
R2    = 0.16; 
F-statistic: 
5.68; 
P=0.000 
R2    = 0.05; 
F-statistic: 
6.45; P=0.000 
R2    = 0.26; 
F-statistic: 
7.36; p=0.000 
***Represent significance at the 1% level; ** Represent significance at the 5% level;  
* Represent significance at the 10% level; Standard error is shown in the parenthesis. 
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Finally, in Model 5, we extend Model 4 by adding all control variables to observe individual 
effect of each independent variable on CDP. The regression results confirm that WOB has 
significant positive association with CDP score, which is consistent with the result in the in 
Models 1, 3 and 4. Thus, H1 is supported, indicating that women in the boardroom increases 
the voluntary disclosure of climate change-related disclosure in the CDP project, which is 
consistent with previous studies of CSR or sustainability (Chang  et al., 2015; Set-Pamies, 
2015; Post, et al., 2011; Prado-Lorenzo and García-Sanchez, 2010; Bear et al., 2010). This 
result confirms the theoretical arguments that women tend to be economically less self-
interested than men (Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1995); and their presence favours problem 
solving, increases leadership effectiveness, and fosters efficiency in the establishment of 
global relationships (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Robinson and Dechant, 1997). This focuses 
on gender diversity implicit to accounts emphasizing social networks (Westphal and Milton, 
2000), Critical Mass Theory (Kramer et al., 2006; Bear et al., 2010) and team dynamics 
(Woolley et al., 2010; and Hoogendoorn et al., 2013). The spin-off benefits arising from 
diversity include enhanced monitoring, more incisive decision-making and greater 
transparency (McGuinness, et al., 2016).  
Further, in Model 5 we find a negative but weak significant relationship between CDP and 
board size (BSIZE), as compared to Model 4. So, H2 is not supported. Jensen (1993) suggests 
that board size is negatively related to the ability of the board to pursue long term strategic 
goals. Jensen (1993) also suggests that the board of directors can do their tasks effectively 
when the board size is not more than seven or eight members. In our study, average size of 
the board is 12 and due to this reason, board size is negatively associated with CDP score. In 
order words, it suggests that it is difficult for a large board to co-ordinate and be involved in 
strategic decision-making (Bonn et al., 2004). Moreover, Lindgreen et al. (2010), who found 
that boards do not have a significant influence on the extent of CSR disclosures. As 
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climate change related risk decisions involve with firms long term strategic goals, therefore, 
it is likely that the small size of board is effective in social and environmental strategic 
decision-making. Firstenberg and Malkiel (1994, p. 34), contend that a small board size of 
eight or fewer members ‘engenders focus, participation, and genuine interaction and debate’ 
for directors to advise management on company issues which satisfied under agency 
perspective (Ong and David, 2008). Again, in Model 5, the CEO duality (CEODU) shows 
insignificant result though with positive sign against negative sign in Model 4, that is no 
association with the CDP score as found in Model 4. So H3 is also not supported.  This 
means that CEODU is less prevalent in making decisions on climate change related-risk 
issues in our sample firms. Taken overall, our results suggest that a woman on board (WOB) 
has strong positive significant association with CDP disclosure but board size and CEO 
duality have not.  
In regards to control variables in Model 5, it is noted that the coefficient of board meetings 
(BOM) is not significant, suggesting that there is no direct link between the overall activities 
of the board and carbon disclosure. This is also supported by Liao et al. (2015) who notice 
that it is true even in the presence of environmental committee.  Firm size (TAS) is positive 
and significant. It is assumed that due to their scale, large firms are more visible, perceived to 
be more polluting, and thus are more likely to be expected to engage in environmental related 
reporting (Hackston and Milne, 1996). Results also show that R&D is insignificant. However, 
ENGC and TOBQ are positively significant at level 1%. The reason for insignificant R&D is 
that it is neither related to the climate change issue nor has involvement to create or invest in 
any technology to reduce carbon emissions. It is also interesting that ENGC (energy 
consumption) is positive and significant with CDP score. This indicates that firms with an 
energy consumption policy are more concerned with environmental issues and as a result, 
they are willing to respond to the CDP project. TOBQ is positively significant, meaning that 
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market-based profitable firms are concerned with climate change-related risks, although 
accounting-based profitability (ROA) is not significant. However, it does indicate that 
profitability is a factor in taking any decisions, especially those related to climate and 
environmental issues.  
7. Conclusion 
The motivation for this study is to examine how the gender composition (women on board) 
affect corporate climate change related disclosure. Our paper examines the effect of gender 
diversity on Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) score/index, in particular the impact of women 
on corporate boards (WOB) on carbon emission disclosure (CDP) from a global perspective 
of 33 countries for the period of 2011-2013. As we mentioned earlier that CDP project has 
been working since 2000 on climate change risks and opportunities and there are currently 
5,500 companies that disclose to CDP covering climate change related disclosure including 
global warming, greenhouse emissions, water and forest-risk commodities (CDP Report, 
2015), therefore, board composition seems to be a major factor which can be assumed to have 
some influence on both CSR and CSR reporting (Rao and Tilt, 2016)  as well as the climate 
change related risk issue.   
We document that woman on board plays a vital role in CDP disclosure. Our study extends 
current theory, in particular resource dependence theory, by demonstrating that the presence 
of women on the board has a positive relationship with the CDP score. The strong 
explanatory power of WOB on CDP disclosure provides evidence of need for gender 
diversity in corporate boards. Our study is, therefore, unique in identifying the corporate 
characteristics for addressing the CDP’s climate change program. Again, we report that board 
size (BSIZE) has negative significant effect on CDP while CEO duality (CEODU) has no real 
effect. In regards to control variables, we find market-based financial performance Tobin’s Q 
(TOBQ), energy consumption (ENGC) and firm size (TAS) appear to have positive 
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significant effect on CDP disclosure, however, board meetings (BOM), research and 
development (R&D) and accounting-based profitability (ROA) indicate no explanatory 
power on CDP. 
Our empirical results have certain policy implications that shed light on how to upgrade the 
response to these issues. Our findings also have important implications for instituting good 
corporate governance and in particular, gender diversity. The outcome of our analysis 
advocates that companies that include women directors with a larger board size, may expect 
to achieve better carbon performance and voluntarily disclose of the level of carbon 
information requested by the CDP. The study of Luo and Tang (2014) also indicates that 
good governance performers in the market are more forthright in reporting their commitment 
to carbon control using the CDP disclosure code. Therefore, our study is relevant to investors 
and other stakeholders in evaluating the accountability of companies in relation to strategies 
for managing climate risk. This study also offers policy makers’ insights into corporate 
governance practices in relation to global warming risks and opportunities in order to meet 
the needs of a low-carbon economy. Because, good corporate governance practices lead to 
reduced agency costs, and good governance performance is likely to disclose more and 
distinguish themselves for their investors and other stakeholders (Clarkson et al., 2008; Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004). In fact, corporate governance mechanisms are usually design to protect 
both shareholders and stakeholders interests in the firms. Our study supports both resource 
dependence and stakeholder theories that boards of directors serve as a linking mechanism 
between companies and their stakeholders, and that they provide legitimacy to different 
stakeholder groups in the society. The positive impact of gender diversification is significant 
as having women directors who can enhance critical analysis in board decision making 
process. Our results contribute to the growing body of literature highlighting the importance 
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of board diversity and governance variables when considering climate change related risk 
issue at the firm level. 
As with all empirical research, this study is not without limitations. First, the study sample 
was composed of CDP data which include 10 different industry sectors, though diversity of 
board may be different by the nature of industry. However, we did not control this industry 
sector variable. Future research can be expanded to examine women on board against 
industry nature of the firms, i.e. sensitive industry, for example health care firm, mining etc. 
Second, we do not consider the effect on CDP scores each year against number of women 
increases in the board room. Third, due to non-availability of data for large number of 
countries, we did not classify women directors as independent or non- independent, so further 
research can be extended by considering directors who may be classified as independent but 
who are actually affiliated with the firm through prior employment or ongoing business 
relations.   
 
Note: 
In this article, we interchange different terms of climate change related risk such as CSR, 
social responsibility, carbon emission, GHG and sustainability, which ultimately concretely 
covers all aspects of climate changes. The same concept is also supported by Prado-Lorenzo 
and Garcia-Sanchez (2010).  
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